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Abstract This paper evaluates the impact of market
competition on health care volume and cost. At the start of
2005, the financing system of Dutch hospitals started to be
gradually changed from a closed-end budgeting system to a
non-regulated price competitive prospective reimburse-
ment system. The gradual implementation of price com-
petition is a ‘natural experiment’ that provides a unique
opportunity to analyze the effects of market competition on
hospital behavior. We have access to a unique database,
which contains hospital discharge data of diagnosis treat-
ment combinations (DBCs) of individual patients, includ-
ing detailed care activities. Difference-in-difference
estimates show that the implementation of market-based
competition leads to relatively lower total costs, production
volume and number of activities overall. Difference-in-
difference estimates on treatment level show that the
average costs for outpatient DBCs decreased due to a
decrease in the number of activities per DBC. The intro-
duction of market competition led to an increase of average
costs of inpatient DBCs. Since both volume and number of
activities have not changed significantly, we conclude that
the cost increase is likely the result of more expensive
activities. A possible explanation for our finding is that
hospitals look for possible efficiency improvements in
predominantly outpatient care products that are relatively
straightforward, using easily analyzable technologies. The
effects of competition on average cost and the relative
shares of inpatient and outpatient treatments on specialty
level are significant but contrary for cardiology and
orthopedics, suggesting that specialties react differently to
competitive incentives.
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competition  Hospital costs  Hospital production
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Introduction
Total health care expenditures in the Netherlands increased
from €6.5 billion in 1972 to €89.7 billion in 2011 [1]. The
dramatic growth in Dutch health care costs is similar to
health care cost increases experienced in other countries.
Before 1983, health care providers were retrospectively
reimbursed by a fee-for-service system. This system relied
on a fee schedule of hospital services with prices regulated
by the National Tariff Agency (NTA). Because hospital
production was not regulated in this system, the volume
and the health care expenditures increased as a result. The
Dutch government tried to control the increasing expen-
ditures by implementing several budgeting systems
between 1983 and 1988, ranging from a budget system
based on previous year expenditures, to a function-based
budget system existing of a combination of (semi-) fixed
and variable budget parameters. In 1995, a budget system
for physicians was introduced to bring the incentives of
both reimbursement systems in line with each other. There
were some drawbacks to these systems. First, there was no
direct relation between tariffs of the budget parameters and
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the actual costs of realized care activities. Second, both
systems ended up with waiting lists. These outcomes led to
broad support for incentive-based reforms and the intro-
duction of managed competition in 2005 [2].
Managed competition is a system in which care con-
sumers can freely choose among health insurers, health
insurers contract or integrate with health care providers,
and governments regulate competition within both health
insurer and health care provider markets to ensure the
public goals of universal access to affordable, quality care
[3–5]. Market competition in the Dutch health care market
implies that insurers and hospitals are allowed to negotiate
freely about health care volume, price and quality, and to
contract selectively. A competitive prospective payment
system called the Diagnosis Treatment Combination sys-
tem was introduced to incentivize hospitals to control their
costs and improve quality and transparency.
Market competition has been implemented incremen-
tally: In 2005 10 % of the health care products, mostly the
more standardized treatments, were transferred from the
budgeting system into the market system. This percentage
was expanded to 20 % in 2008, to 34 % in 2009 and
eventually to 70 % in 2012. In the new system, new pro-
viders are allowed to enter the hospital market, which
resulted in a strong growth of Independent Treatment
Centers (ITCs) providing high-volume elective care.
This paper analyzes the impact of market competition
on health care volume and costs. The implementation of
the system is a ‘natural experiment’ and its incremental
introduction offers the opportunity to compare the perfor-
mance of experimental product groups in the competitive
market with the performance of control groups that are still
in the budgeting system.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we
tested the effects of market competition in a unique setting
in which all hospitals of the Netherlands are included.
Within this setting, over the years we observed the
implementation of a competitive prospective payment
system for some care products, while others remained in
the pre-reform budget financing system. This allows us to
use the difference-in-difference method to assess the
effects on volume and costs. Secondly, our unique database
allowed us to measure care intensity more completely and
reliably, where previous studies had to rely on crude
proxies, e.g. number of admissions or length of stay. Our
database contains hospital discharge data of more than
800,000 Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (in Dutch:
DBCs) of individual patients, including detailed care
activities provided by medical specialists and support staff.
This system was systematically applied by all Dutch hos-
pitals in the selected period of 2006–2008.
This paper is organized as follows. The following sec-
tion describes the microeconomic considerations. The
section ‘‘Problem formulation’’ discusses the Dutch policy
context and the hypotheses. The section ‘‘Data and model
specification’’ explains the difference-in-difference models
used, the variables and the data. The section ‘‘Results’’
presents the results of the research. The conclusion is
provided in the section ‘‘Conclusion’’. The last section
‘‘Discussion and limitations’’ describes the results and
address several limitations.
Microeconomic considerations
Health care markets deviate from perfectly competitive
markets. The industrial organization of health care views
hospitals as entities operating in an environment of
monopolistic competition. Each hospital sells a differenti-
ated product, while a patient’s preference for a health care
provider is determined on real or perceived differences in
ability and the idiosyncratic match. This limits substi-
tutability of health care providers. Consequently, health
care providers may increase price or decrease some quality
attributes without losing all their patients to other providers
[6]. In other words, product prices are not perfectly elastic,
leading to unequal provider power over price and produc-
tion. Furthermore, the health care market suffers from
asymmetric information problems at different levels, e.g.,
between patient and physician and between hospital and
insurer. Information asymmetry problems may lead to
over- or under-consumption of health care. These problems
may be aggravated by adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in both the hospital market and the health
insurance market [6–9]. We expect health care demand,
either expressed by privately insured patients, their refer-
ring physicians, or as intermediated by managed care, to be
negatively related to price. The price elasticity of demand
in specific health care markets is considered to be depen-
dent on hospital characteristics, quality of the health pro-
duct, and both supply and demand conditions.
When a government administratively determines prices,
the only option left to hospitals is to compete on quality in
order to attract patients. Studies from the UK show that
with fixed prices and more competition, quality increases
[10–12]. However, setting the appropriate price is crucial,
as too-high prices may motivate hospitals to increase costs
by providing additional unnecessary medical services and
amenities. In the situation where both prices and quality
vary, the market outcome will depend on the relative size
of the elasticity of demand with respect to quality and
price. Gaynor and Town [13] show the relationship
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where z is quality, p price, d the marginal cost of quality, ez
the quality elasticity of demand and ep the price elasticity
of demand. This formula shows that if, in a market with
variable prices, the quality elasticity of demand increases
or price elasticity of demand decreases, the quality will
increase. On the other hand, quality will decrease when
quality elasticity of demand decreases or price elasticity of
demand increases [13].
The above holds true when health insurers are perfectly
informed about price and quality. However, in most health
care markets and also in our observation period, quality
information is relatively limited [14]. When quality is not
perfectly observable, health consumers will not react to
quality differences. Thus, the absolute quality elasticity of
demand is low. When price information becomes less noisy
because of the introduction of health care production sys-
tems, like Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) or DBC sys-
tems, and when price differences between care suppliers
become transparent, health care demand will be more
price-elastic. This will drive health care prices and price–
cost margins down [15].
With lower prices, hospitals can only maintain price–
cost margins by reducing costs. Hospitals can reduce costs
in several ways. First, hospitals can obtain cost cuts by
performing fewer activities per treatment, by performing
less expensive activities for a given diagnosis or by
changing the treatment choices for a given diagnosis.
Concerning the latter, for instance, specialists could shift
from inpatient treatments to daycare or outpatient treat-
ments. Ultimately this depends on cost-price margins of
different treatments. Since we do not observe these, it will
be difficult to predict a priori just how treatment choices
will change.
When prices are set by the government in a budgeting
system, hospital production is maximized to the budgeted
volumes, since production beyond the budget will not be
reimbursed. When the budgeting system is replaced by a
market system in which hospitals are reimbursed via pay-
ment-for-performance, there is no upper limit to health
production. Hospitals will forecast the demand of care and
determine the required input capacity. However, when the
actual demand exceeds the predicted demand, the input
capacity will be too low. Hospitals have to decrease their
resources, which could lead to poor quality. When the
actual demand is beyond the predicted demand, the input
capacitance will be too large which may lead to ineffi-
ciency or congestion [16].
Problem formulation
The impact of competition in the health care sector
depends on the purchasing strategy of health insurers, the
way hospitals compete with each other, the rules under
which competition takes place and design of the reim-
bursement systems of hospitals and physicians. Hospital
competition can be divided into patient-driven competition
and payer-driven competition. In patient-driven competi-
tive systems, the patient or his physician chooses a hospital
for treatment. When patients are insured, their demands are
not price-sensitive because insured patients do not incur
high out-of-pocket expenses [6, 17]. Under patient-driven
competition, hospitals are generally reimbursed on a fee-
for-service basis. The empirical literature is inconclusive
about the impact of patient-driven competition on prices,
costs and volume of care. Early US studies show that more
competition among hospitals leads to lower prices and
costs [17–19]. The negative association of market con-
centration with prices appears to be mediated by the level
of price sensitivity of demand [20]. Other studies conclude
that patient-driven competition with fee-for-service reim-
bursement leads to increasing prices and expenses, because
hospitals compete on quality services and amenities, driv-
ing health care costs up due to the provision of duplicated
capital-intensive services [21–25]. This form of competi-
tion, which is also known as the theory of the ‘medical
arms race’ (MAR), drives up prices and health care costs.
When the number of hospitals in a health care market
increases, each patient or physician gets more bargaining
power and can play the hospitals off against each other. In
this way, health care consumers can extract more services
and a higher quality of care from the providers [6, 26, 27].
Payer-driven competition is a system in which the
insurer, not the patient or his physician, selects the health
care provider and decides about care consumption. In a
payer-driven competitive market, purchasers may restrict
patient’s hospital choice by selectively contracting hospi-
tals based on price benefits, quality requirements and ser-
vice levels rather than idiosyncratic advantages. High
purchaser concentration leads to monopsony power, which
generally results in lower price–cost margins for hospitals,
especially in competitive health care markets [17]. Propper
et al. reviewed all price studies about payer-driven com-
petition in the UK and concluded that there are large price
differences between health care providers offering com-
parable care. Studies that examine the relationship between
hospital competition and prices show that more competi-
tion results in lower prices for low-cost and elective care
medical specialties [15]. So¨derlund analyzed the relation-
ship between competition and average costs per inpatient
episode for acute care hospitals and found a positive, but
non-significant relationship between market concentration
and costs [28].
The Dutch health care market is a combination of
patient- and payer-driven competitive systems. Almost all
patients in the Netherlands are insured because of the
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mandatory health insurance system, which includes virtu-
ally no co-payments and a low optional deductible [29].
Health insurers ‘manage competition’ by negotiating with
health care providers about price, volume and quality of
care for their enrollees. Most insurance companies have
contracted almost every hospital and therefore selective
contracting is hardly ever used. Patients may freely select
the hospital and they are relatively price insensitive
because of the insurance policy they hold.
To understand the incentives within the reformed Dutch
hospital market, insight is needed into the hospital payment
systems before and after the implementation of the Dutch
health care reforms in 2005, because during our research
period the old system still existed for a part of the hospital
production. Before the health care reforms, hospitals and
physicians were reimbursed by separate payment systems.
Hospitals received a budget, which consisted of a combi-
nation of (semi-) fixed and variable budget parameters. The
tariffs of these parameters were fixed. Only the volume of
variable budget parameters was determined by negotiations
between hospital and health insurer. Variable budget
parameters are, for example, outpatient visits, day care, and
inpatient days. When a hospital exceeded or underspent the
budget, an adjustment rate balanced the hospital’s budget
retrospectively. Physicians also received a budget for their
services, the so-called lump sum system. Both systems
stimulated hospitals and physicians to control hospital
expenditures. Hospitals and physicians had no incentive to
treat more patients or to increase the number of activities
per patient. The advantage of the budget system is that it
led to expenditure control. The disadvantage is that waiting
lists were being created and waiting times were getting
longer, which had negative consequences for patient needs
and quality of care [2].
The incentives of the Diagnosis Treatment Combina-
tions (DBC) system should motivate hospitals and physi-
cians to treat all patients that need hospital care and to
provide only necessary services. This Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG)-based system has the incentive to increase
the number of cases and decrease the number of services
per case. Hospitals negotiate about the volume and price
and quality of 10 % of the hospital expenses, the so-called
B-segment. However, relevant information was scant. We
therefore expect that health insurers will compete more on
price, which will lead to lower costs or number of activities
per case. However, we must not forget that price compe-
tition could also result in lower quality [30], but we could
not observe quality differences during our research period.
Because physicians were paid per DBC and health insurers
were not able to select contracting hospitals, we expect
volume increase in the B-segment. For 90 %, the A-seg-
ment, the FB budget and lump sum budget still existed. The
A-segment still has the incentives to control the number of
cases and hospital services in order to not exceed the
budget. The B-segment gradually increased to 20 % of the
hospital expenses in 2008, 34 % in 2009 and to 70 % in
2012.
In this study, we focus on the short-term effects of
market competition. Based on the above-mentioned con-
siderations, our hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 The introduction of market competition in
the Dutch quasi-market system (the B segment) will lead to
higher production volume of DBCs.
Hypothesis 2 The introduction of market competition in
the Dutch quasi-market system (the B segment) will lead to
lower average costs or to fewer health care activities per
DBC than under the budgeting system.
Data and model specification
The treatment group B2 in our difference-in-difference
model contains DBCs that were transferred from the bud-
get-based system into the market competition system in
2008. The control group B3 consists of products that
remained in the budget-based system but entered the
competitive system in the next round in 2009. A graphic
representation of the two groups is depicted in Fig. 1.
Assignment of treatment and control group
The introduction of market coordination in the Netherlands
followed an incremental process, in which four groups of
DBCs were transferred from the budgeting system into the
market system: the first started in 2005, the second group
followed in 2008, the third in 2009 and the last group in
2012.
Mainly low-complexity care DBCs with clear product
definitions and transparent information about quality and
price were eligible to be transferred to the market system.
The Dutch health care market for the selected low-complex
DBCs also needed to be sufficiently efficient, which meant a
market in which many suppliers are active, in which patients
can freely select their preferred health care provider and
which offers ample opportunities for new providers to enter
themarket. Themarkets for the selectedDBCs also needed to
have low market failures such as negative external effects
and high transaction costs [31]. In this market hospitals
provide services to all patients that need hospital care for the
lowest cost and an accepted quality level. Hospitals are only
trying to minimize the number of services per case without
jeopardizing standard quality and are not able to manipulate
the number of cases [32].
The implementation process started with the low-com-
plexity care DBCs and the level of complexity gradually
rose as the implementation process evolved. For our
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difference-in-difference analysis we selected the second
DBC group as the experimental group and the third DBC
group as the control group. We did not use the first DBC
group in order to avoid the irregularities related to the first
implementation and the non-existence of comparable pro-
duction data in the years prior to 2005. We expected that
providers did have some market experience by the time the
second DBC group was transferred, which may have led to
more effective market responses. We also expected the
second and third groups to be comparable in level of health
care complexity and relevant market characteristics, which
makes them suitable for our difference-in-difference
analyses.
DIS data 2006–2008
The production and cost data are taken from the DBC
Information System (DIS) for the years 2006 and 2008. In
the analyses, we use 2006 as a pre-reform year and 2008 as
a post-reform year. However, hospitals may have antici-
pated the change in 2007, which was the reason for using
2006 as the pre-reform year. The DIS national database
consists of DBC data and patient-level care activities from
all Dutch hospitals. University hospitals and specialty
hospitals are excluded from the database. Six general
hospitals are also excluded because three denied permis-
sion to use their data and three appeared to have incom-
plete data in the DIS. The B2 and B3 segments consist of
3327 and 2123 unique DBC codes, respectively. We
selected high-volume diagnoses and excluded DBCs with
‘follow-up treatment’ type of care. This resulted in 11
diagnoses: 46 DBCs of 4 medical specialties (cardiology,
dermatology, gastroenterology and orthopedics) in the B2-
segment, and 10 diagnoses with 54 DBC codes of 3 spe-
cialties (cardiology, dermatology and orthopedics) in the
B3 segment. Our dataset contains 974,592 DBC records,
representing 25 % of the total cases of the B2 and B3
segments. The selected DBC codes are depicted in Table 1.
We tested the dataset for the completeness, consistency
and reliability of the data. To check the completeness, we
removed DBC cases when the DBC information was
incomplete (missing parts of DBC codes, episode numbers
and dates), erroneous (non-matching episode start date,
activity dates and end date; or activity codes containing
zeros or negative values), or empty (not containing any
care activity information). To screen the consistency, dif-
ferent synonymous treatment code names were pooled into
the same categories and some ‘‘exotic’’ DBCs like ‘‘urgent
care’’ DBCs that only existed for a short period of time
were excluded from the database. To check the reliability
of the data, we excluded extreme high cost outliers from
the database. The procedures followed led to the removal
of 16.5 % of the cases. Our final dataset contains produc-
tion data of 72 Dutch general hospitals, representing 75 %
of all Dutch general hospitals. The final dataset contains
814,192 DBCs, from which 390,770 DBCs are from 2006
and 413,422 DBCs are from 2008.
Dependent variables
We use four outcome measures. The DBC volume is the
number of registered and charged cases for each DBC care
product per hospital (‘‘DBC volume’’). DBC activities are
the average number of care activities in a DBC per hospital
(‘‘DBC activities’’). This variable is calculated as the total
number of activities produced in a hospital for a DBC care
product divided by the total number of DBC cases deliv-
ered. The total cost of DBCs produced (‘‘DBC total cost’’)
is calculated by multiplying the average cost per DBC by
the number of DBC cases produced for each hospital. The
DBC average cost (‘‘DBC average cost’’) is the average
cost per DBC delivered per hospital. The DBC average cost
is determined by the sum of the costs of all activities
represented in the DBC care profile. The care profile
contains a number of activities such as (outpatient) visits,
admissions, bed days and type and volume of care activi-
ties. The cost of each activity is calculated by multiplying
the actual number of care activities delivered in a DBC by
a health care provider with standardized national prices
from 2005. The national activity prices are derived from
cost prices of 39 frontrunner hospitals that participated in
the development of the DBC system [33]. The DBC can be
linked to the care profile using unique identification num-
bers. After linking the full cost prices to the activities, all
costs of product activities are aggregated to the total costs
per DBC. The average DBC cost in each hospital is then
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Fig. 1 Graphic representation
of treatment group (B2) and
control group (B3)
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calculated in order to arrive at cost differences for each
DBC between hospitals. Price levels in 2005 are also
applied to the 2008 DBCs. This is done in order to avoid
the impact of price differences on cost information, so that
cost differences are only caused by differences in volume
and composition of care activities. Because we used a
refined proxy for cost based on patient level activities, we
were able to analyze changes in resource consumption.
This means that we could examine changes in the number
of inputs or combination of inputs. However, these costs
might differ from the actual hospital cost. The DBC
average cost, therefore, does not represent the actual costs
incurred by hospitals, but represents care intensity whereby
each care activity is weighted according to its relative cost.
In this way, substitution between activities with different
cost prices can be detected, and differences in resource use
become visible. However, because actual hospital costs are
not available we cannot measure forms of X-inefficiency as
a result of the reform.
To correct for right-skewed distributions we used the
natural logarithm of the variables’ average costs, volume
and average number of activities [34].
Independent variables
Treatment variables A market competition dummy is
used to indicate whether a DBCi is in the B2 group, which
will at some point of time enter the market competition
system (value 1), or in the B3 group, which will remain in
the budget system (value 0). The model also includes a
year dummy for 2008. The treatment variable is an inter-
action variable of the market competition and year dum-
mies to identify the B2 DBCs that went into the
competitive market in 2008.
Environmental and hospital characteristics Hospitals
could react differently to competition because of their
environmental factors such as market structure, insurer
concentration, ageing population or hospital characteristics
such as type and size of hospital [32]. To measure market
concentration of hospitals, we calculate each hospital-DBC
combination using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI),
which is the sum of squared market shares of the B2 and
B3 volume of the hospitals competing in the same market.
We define the relevant market of a hospital based on a
Table 1 Sample selected DBCs of treatment group (B2) and control group (B3)
Segment Specialty Diagnosis code Diagnosis name Treatment codes
B2 Cardiology 302 Chronic heart failure 111,112, 113
B2 Cardiology 401 Cardiac atrium fibrillation 111, 112, 113
B2 Cardiology 402 Other cardiac arrhythmia originated
in cardiac atrium
111, 112, 113
B2 Cardiology 404 Cardiac impulse disorder 111, 112, 113
B2 Cardiology 409 Other cardiac arrhythmia 111, 112, 113
B2 Dermatology 20 Psoriasiform dermatoses 11, 81, 82, 92, 93
B2 Gastroenterology 601 Inflammatory bowel disease 101, 102, 103, 202, 203
B2 Gastroenterology 602 Ulcerative colitis 101, 102, 103, 202, 203
B2 Orthopedics 1630 Carpal tunnel syndrome 211, 212, 213, 216
B2 Orthopedics 1805 Meniscal injury 211, 212, 213, 216, 223, 226
B2 Orthopedics 1820 Anterior cruciate ligament injury 211, 212, 213, 216, 223, 226
B3 Cardiology 202 Angina pectoris, stable 101, 102, 103
B3 Cardiology 203 Angina pectoris, unstable 101, 102, 103
B3 Cardiology 302 Chronic heart failure 101, 102, 103
B3 Cardiology 401 Cardiac atrium fibrillation 101, 102, 103
B3 Cardiology 402 Other cardiac arrhythmia originated
in cardiac atrium
101, 102, 103
B3 Dermatology 14 Malignant dermatosis 11, 21, 31, 41, 51, 81, 82, 92, 93
B3 Dermatology 22 Ulcus cruris 11, 31, 71, 92, 93
B3 Orthopedics 1240 Cervical stenosis with myelopathy 111. 112, 113, 211, 212, 213, 216, 223, 226
B3 Orthopedics 1350 Spinal stenosis 111, 112, 113, 211, 212, 213, 216
B3 Orthopedics 1803 Loosening/infection malposition
knee arthroplasty
111, 112, 113, 211, 212, 213, 216, 223, 226
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patient’s maximum travel time of 15 min to a hospital
using ZIP code-4 information, which means that the
maximum travel time between two hospitals is 30 min. The
insurance market concentration variable is determined by
the HHI of the market shares of the insurance companies
for each hospital and each DBC. Health insurers are
grouped into 11 major (holding) companies. We have
grouped ten small health insurance companies together in a
category ‘‘other’’, which together occupy 0.62 % of the
market share. The data on health insurers was derived from
the DIS database. For each hospital, we identified the
number of DBCs invoiced to each of the health insurers.
Hospitals with more than 10 % of DBCs that could not be
invoiced to a health insurer are excluded. A low hospital
insurer concentration index means that the total hospital
production regarding a certain DBC is equally financed by
a large number of insurance companies. A high hospital-
insurer concentration indicates monopsonic power held by
a few insurance companies financing a large portion of care
regarding a given DBC. We furthermore include a dummy
for type of hospital to control for level of technology
(dummy 1 = general hospital; dummy 0 = teaching hos-
pital). To examine whether large hospitals differ from
small hospitals we include a variable ‘‘size of hospital’’
which is measured by the revenues of each hospital. We
also control for the percentage of hospital revenues that is
part of the competitive segment because we expect that
hospitals that have a larger proportion of revenues in the
competitive segment expand the B-segment more easily.
Finally, to control for case mix differences, we include
‘‘the percentage of patients older than 65’’ as a proxy
variable.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the model
variables for 2006 and 2008. The model uses 8723 obser-
vations from 110 DBCs produced by 72 hospitals in
2 years. This database consists of 40 general and 32
teaching hospitals. The average number of DBCs slightly
increased from 89 in 2006 to 95 in 2008. The volume on
DBC level varies per hospital. The average cost per DBC
was €1040 in 2006 and €1016 in 2008. The average total
DBC cost decreased from €75,879 in 2006 to €74,793 in
2008. The revenues of Dutch hospitals ranged from €28
billion for the smallest hospital to more than €357 billion
for the largest hospital. The average hospital market HHI is
0.276 (SD is 0.243). In general, markets with a concen-
tration index more than 0.18 are concentrated markets [33].
This means that the Dutch hospital market is concentrated.
However, hospital concentration is differentiated and var-
ies between 0.038 and 1. The average hospital-insurer
concentration index is 0.383 and varies between 0.177 and
0.641, showing that hospital-insurer concentration is even
stronger than hospital concentration. This could be a result
of the former leading region representative positions of
health insurers [35].
Table 3 shows the changes in volume, activities and
average costs between 2006 and 2008 of the treatment and
control group DBCs. The care volume of two-thirds of the
DBCs in both groups has increased between 2006 and 2008.
The average cost decreased in both segments. In the B2 seg-
ment, for seven out of the 11 DBCs, average costs decreased.
An exception is ulcerative colitis, with a cost increase ofmore
than 15 %. For eight of the ten DBCs in the B3 segment,
average costs decreased. Activity changes differ between the
segments and within the specialties, indicating that perform-
ing fewer activities does not automatically lead to a cost
decrease. For example, activities increased for carpal tunnel
syndrome, other cardiac arrhythmia originating in the cardiac
atrium and cardiac atrium fibrillation, but total costs of these
DBCs decreased. This indicates a shift from more expensive
activities to less expensive activities and possibly a substitu-
tion or a shift from inpatient treatments to outpatient or day-
care treatments.
Empirical model
To identify the impact of the introduction of market
coordination we estimated two difference-in-difference
(DiD) models. We examined the impact of market com-
petition on four dependent variables at the hospital level:
production volume, number of activities, total costs and
average costs, using the following model:
yijt ¼ aþ b1I ðYear ¼ 2008Þt þ b2B2i þ b3B2i
 I Year ¼ 2008ð ÞtþcXjt þ lj þ eijt;Model I
where yijt is the dependent variable for DBC i in hospital
j at time t. a is the intercept. I is the year dummy with value
0 for 2006 and 1 for 2008. B2 is the market competition
variable, which takes the value 1 if DBC i is part of the B2
segment and 0 if DBC i is part of the B3 segment. A DBC
is produced in 2008 when the treatment is delivered by the
care provider, and accepted and registered by the insurance
company in that year. Xjt are the specialty dummies at
the hospital level. The specialty dummy for Orthope-
dics is used as the basis and is included in the intercept.
lj are the hospital fixed effects and ejt is the error term.
We use adjusted standard errors to control for the
clustering of DBCs on the hospital level. The coeffi-
cient capturing the impact of the introduction of market
competition is b3: the effect of post-reform market
coordination on the dependent variables’ DBC pro-
duction volume, average DBC costs and average num-
ber of activities in DBCs. To examine the heterogeneity
of hospitals we also estimate a model including hos-
pitals’ characteristics (Model II).
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Of relevance for the empirical strategy is whether the
common trends assumption is satisfied. After all, violation
of this assumption makes it difficult to interpret b3 as the
proper treatment effect (i.e., the effect of the introduction
of competition). We tested for the common trend
assumption by estimating model (I) on data of 2006 and
2007 alone, with year 2008 replaced by 2007. These tests
indicated that for all four outcome variables the common
trend assumption cannot be rejected at the 5 % level. It
should be noted, however, that for the logarithm of total
volume, the coefficient was significant at the 10 % level
(see ‘‘Appendix’’ for the results of this test). It is important
to note that in our test for the common trends assumption
we have only three data points available, of which two are
prior to the reforms: we can construct a placebo DiD of
2006 and 2007. This placebo DiD indicates that the com-
mon trend is not violated, though it has to be added that the
power of the test may be low. On the other hand, possible
anticipation effects may lead us to reject the common
trends assumption sooner. As was argued earlier (see ‘‘DIS
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
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data 2006–2008’’), hospitals may have anticipated the
change of 2008 and in response to this may have already
adjusted their production decisions prior to 2008.1
Results
Table 4 provides the results of the DiD models for each
outcome measure: volume, activities, total costs and
average costs. The results for the pooled data in Model I
show a decrease in total cost, production volume and
average number of activities that can be attributed to the
introduction of market coordination. The reduction in
volume is contrary to our expectation (hypothesis 1). Total
costs are significantly lower than in the reference group,
which is in accordance with hypothesis 2. The lower total
costs appears to be the result of the reduction in total
number of DBCs produced as well as in average number of
activities per DBC. The two main drivers of lower costs are
therefore a lower number of DBCs produced as well as
lower care intensity per DBC. The dummies indicate that
significant differences in all dependent variables exist
between medical specializations and that the impact of
market coordination on volume and cost may be special-
ization-specific.
The results of Model II indicate that the treatment
effects comparing to our basic regression in Model I are
virtually identical. Amongst the observed hospital charac-
teristics, type of hospital is the most important. The relation
between type of hospital and the dependent variables are
negative, which means that general hospitals have a lower
average volume, lower average number of activities, and
lower average and total costs compared with teaching
hospitals. The level of technology differs among the types
of hospitals.
The introduction of market coordination may work out
differently for different types of health care services. We
therefore partitioned our data into three groups: outpatient
care, daycare, and inpatient care. The results in Table 5
Table 3 Change in volume, average cost, activities, and total cost in 2006–2008 for treatment group (B2) and control group (B3) DBCs












B2 Orthopedics Carpal tunnel syndrome -0.56 14.01 -8.77 -3.76
B2 Orthopedics Meniscal injury -0.40 2.86 1.94 2.59
B2 Orthopedics Anterior cruciate ligament injury -8.41 -5.32 -7.60 7.58
B2 Dermatology Psoriasiform dermatoses 19.87 -4.21 1.01 -18.31
B2 Gastroenterology Inflammatory bowel disease 20.40 -3.44 -0.21 -5.80
B2 Gastroenterology Ulcerative colitis 20.92 9.63 3.52 15.99
B2 Cardiology Chronic heart failure 88.20 7.50 71.35 4.91
B2 Cardiology Cardiac atrium fibrillation 61.01 6.20 68.74 -2.00
B2 Cardiology Other cardiac arrhythmia originated
in cardiac atrium
60.91 -28.06 49.30 -30.68
B2 Cardiology Cardiac impulse disorder 43.86 -1.65 25.10 -8.32
B2 Cardiology Other cardiac arrhythmia -16.03 4.83 -21.74 -8.80
B3 Orthopedics Cervical stenosis with myelopathy 42.67 18.44 63.73 3.22
B3 Orthopedics Spinal stenosis 39.46 -7.13 -0.11 -8.31
B3 Orthopedics Loosening/infection malposition knee
arthroplasty
31.19 2.75 13.44 1.84
B3 Dermatology Malignant dermatosis 6.02 6.90 11.49 -6.29
B3 Dermatology Ulcus cruris -2.84 -13.44 -15.09 -0.90
B3 Cardiology Angina pectoris (stable) 13.68 6.65 -10.35 -4.31
B3 Cardiology Angina pectoris (unstable) -14.17 4.22 -8.90 -5.88
B3 Cardiology Chronic heart failure 31.10 3.06 -6.15 -6.63
B3 Cardiology Cardiac atrium fibrillation -5.27 7.10 -8.89 -11.10
B3 Cardiology Other cardiac arrhythmia originated
in cardiac atrium
16.03 7.54 13.76 -10.85
1 For this reason we decided to only use 2006 and 2008 to estimate
our models.
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show that the introduction of market coordination has led
to increased efficiency in outpatient treatments (see Panel
A), where a reduction in number of activities also led to
lower average cost per DBC. The number of daycare
DBCs is lower in the experimental group, without any
significant effect on total and average costs (Panel B).
Average cost of inpatient DBCs is significantly higher for
the market competition group, while there is no signifi-
cant difference in volume or activities (refer to Panel C).
This indicates that only patients with more complicated,
and hence more expensive, conditions are hospitalized;
relatively more patients with fewer complications and
similar diseases may be treated in daycare and in
policlinics.
Effects on specialty level: orthopedics
and cardiology
The higher number of significant specialization dummies in
Table 4 already signals that the effects of the introduction
of market coordination may be different across medical
specializations. For example, specializations may differ on
the choice of care type, substituting inpatient care with
daycare and outpatient treatments. We therefore performed
Table 4 Difference-in-Difference results for volume (ln), activities (ln), average cost (ln) and total cost (ln)





















































































































































































R-squared 0.151 0.288 0.147 0.170 0.131 0.270 0.129 0.164
Std. Err. adjusted for 72 clusters on hospital level
Model I: yijt = a ? b1I(Year = 2008)t ? b2B2i ? b3B2i * I(Year = 2008)t ? cXjt ? lj ? eijt Number of observations: 8723 Model II:
yijt = a ? b1I(Year = 2008)t ? b2B2i ? b3B2i * I(Year = 2008)t ? cXjt ? dZjt ? eijt Number of observations: 7423
* significance at the 10% level ** significance at the 5% level *** significance at the 1% level t-value in parentheses
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Table 5 Different health care
types
Volume (ln) Activities (ln) Total cost (ln) Average cost (ln)
Panel A: Outpatient DBCs
























































R-squared 0.439 0.583 0.423 0.264
Panel B: Daycare DBCs
























































R-squared 0.072 0.431 0.116 0.369
Panel C: Inpatient DBCs
























































R-squared 0.412 0.391 0.347 0.306
Std. Err. adjusted for 72 clusters on hospital level
Model I: yijt = a ? b1I(Year = 2008)t ? b2B2i ? b3B2i * I(Year = 2008)t ? cXjt ? lj ? eijt
Number of observations inpatient: 2228
Number of observations outpatient: 2401
Number of observations daycare: 1814
* significance at the 10% level ** significance at the 5% level *** significance at the 1% level t-value in
parentheses
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analyses at the specialty level, examining whether the
introduction of competition changes treatment choices (and
thus costs). We selected for this analysis the medical spe-
cialties orthopedics and cardiology, because they are rep-
resented in both the experimental as well as in the control
group. One advantage is that within cardiology, three
diagnoses exist for which different treatment choices
(DBCs) are available. For instance, DBCs of the diagnosis
of chronic heart failure can be found both in the B2 seg-
ment (where competition was introduced in 2008) and the
B3 segment (no competition). For orthopedics, we do not
have this ‘ideal’ set-up of different treatments for a given
diagnosis that are in both segments. We therefore used
different diagnoses within the specialty, some of which are
exposed to market competition and some which are not.
For both specialties, we examined the effect of competition
on the share of inpatient, daycare and outpatient treatments
used for a given diagnosis. Table 6 shows the results of the
regression analysis of inpatient, daycare and outpatient
share and average costs (ln) for cardiology and orthopedics
DBCs.
The results of the two medical specialties differ greatly.
For cardiology, we see a decrease in the share of inpatient
treatments (Panel A in Table 6). We also see an increase in
the share of daycare treatments. It is not likely that the
composition of the pool of patients changed in our obser-
vation period (2006–2008). Therefore, a possible expla-
nation for the observed shift in shares is that for a given
diagnosis, more expensive inpatient treatments are replaced
by cheaper daycare treatments. As a result, the average
costs of treatment for a given diagnosis declines. For
orthopedics, we find different results (see Panel B). In
response to the market competition introduction, the pro-
portion of inpatient treatments and outpatient treatments
increased. As a result, the average costs for the diagnosis
increased. The proportion of daycare treatments decreased.
These analyses show that it is difficult to predict in advance
whether market competition leads to lower average costs.
We find that the effect of market competition differs
between specialties.
Two mechanisms may explain this finding. First, dif-
ferences in price–cost margins of inpatient, and daycare
and outpatient procedures at the diagnosis level may
explain physician treatment choices. Unfortunately, we do
not have access to price information at the diagnosis level
to verify this. Second, the composition of the patient pool
may have changed over time. Note that we only use data of
a relatively short time span (2006–2008), so it is not likely
that the patient case mix changed dramatically. Alterna-
tively, physicians may have influenced the composition of
the patient pool endogenously (by choice). For instance,
they might change the admission criteria for treatment of a
given diagnosis. The ability to do this may differ per
specialty and at the diagnosis level. Note, however, that
this must be differentially for B2 and B3 and one should
see this reflected in the B2 (and B3) volumes. We do not
observe clear volume effects in Table 5, which suggests
that differences in price–cost margins may be more
relevant.
Conclusion
This paper assessed the effect of the introduction of mar-
ket-based price competition on costs and volume in Dutch
hospitals in the years 2006 and 2008. The gradual imple-
mentation of market competition for some products, and
not for others, provided a unique opportunity to analyze the
effects of market competition on hospital behavior. More
specifically, we used 46 care products (DBCs) belonging to
11 diagnoses that were part of the budget system in 2006
and that went into the price competitive segment in 2008
(B2-DBCs). We compared these with 54 similar care
products belonging to 10 diagnoses that stayed in the
budget system (B3-DBCs). The database contains 814,192
observations (DBCs produced and invoiced), roughly
equally divided between 2006 and 2008, and produced by
72 general hospitals.
Difference-in-difference estimates show that the imple-
mentation of market-based competition leads to relatively
lower total costs, production volume and number of
activities overall. The decrease in volume in the experi-
mental group compared with the reference group is not
what we expected. A possible explanation is that the
exogenous demand of care is rather limited because of the
relatively short research period. Amongst the observed
hospital characteristics, type of hospital is the most
important. General hospitals have a lower average volume,
lower average number of activities, and lower average and
total costs compared with teaching hospitals, as expected.
Market concentration of hospitals does not have an impact
and insurers do not use their monopsony power to selec-
tively contract hospitals, which could be explained by the
limited share of the market competitive segment in the
research period.
To identify these results further, we estimated a DiD
model on treatment level. Results show that the average
costs for outpatient DBCs decreased due to a decrease in
the number of activities per DBC. The introduction of
market competition led to an increase of average costs of
inpatient DBCs. Since both volume and number of activi-
ties have not changed significantly, we conclude that the
cost increase is likely the result of more expensive
activities.
A possible explanation for our finding is that hospitals
may focus on efficiency improvements in outpatient care
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products that are relatively straightforward, using easily
analyzable technologies.
The relative shares of inpatient and outpatient care differ
between medical specializations. In orthopedics, daycare
care is substituted with outpatient and inpatient care,
leading to higher average inpatient costs. In cardiology, a
reverse substitution has been detected, leading to a lower
share of inpatients and thus lower average costs.
The Dutch government introduced market competition
as an instrument to control health care cost and increase
transparency and quality of care. Therefore different health
care reforms have been introduced. During our research
Table 6 Difference-in-difference results for share of outpatient care, daycare and inpatient care for cardiology and orthopedics
Share Outpatient Share Daycare Share Inpatient Average cost (ln)
Panel A: Cardiology
















































R-squared 0.198 0.134 0.802 0.509
Panel B: Orthopedics








































































R-squared 0.330 0.734 0.369 0.519
Std. Err. adjusted for 72 clusters on hospital level
Model I: yijt = a ? b1I(Year = 2008)t ? b2B2i ? b3B2i * I(Year = 2008)t ? cXjt ? lj ? eijt
Number of observations Cardiology: 1151 Orthopedics: 1482
Selection of diagnoses including both B2 & B3 DBCs
* significance at the 10% level ** significance at the 5% level *** significance at the 1% level t-value in parentheses
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period the hospital reimbursement system was gradually
implemented and quality information was not yet available,
which means that not all necessary conditions for market
competition were met. This could explain why theresults of
this research are relatively limited and sometimes differ
from theexpectations of government.
Limitations of this study
There are several limitations of this study. The first limi-
tation is inherent to the difference-in-difference method-
ology followed. In this approach, an experimental group of
DBCs was selected along with a DBC control group. We
have tried to select DBCs that are similar in a number of
ways, e.g., belonging to the same medical specialization
and having comparable technological complexities, and we
performed a first test of the common trends assumption.
The common trends assumption was not violated, but it has
to be noted that our test may have suffered from low
power, due to the limited number of pre-treatment years.
All DBCs in both groups represent elective-care DBCs
with relatively low levels of complexity. Our results may
be different when more complex DBCs are considered. As
the implementation of the market system in the Nether-
lands progresses, increasingly more complicated DBCs
will be transferred from the budgeting system into the
market system. These changes in the system will provide
fresh opportunities to study the impact of the system
change on cost and intensity of more complex health care
products.
Our sample only included general hospitals, not aca-
demic hospitals and independent treatment centers, because
of limitations in data access. This is an important omission,
because we have seen that in certain conditions, e.g., a
high-proportion A-segment production, inpatient costs
have increased. This could also apply to academic hospi-
tals. A similar restriction applies to independent treatment
centers. We expect that the ITCs have economized sig-
nificantly regarding outpatient treatments, which means
that we may have underestimated the cost reduction effects
for the sector as a whole.
Our analysis mainly focused on cost and intensity of
care, and did not consider the effects of the introduction of
market competition on quality of care. The main reason is
that we could not find sufficiently complete and reliable
quality information for our sample DBCs in the years 2006
and 2008. This is an important topic for future research,
because cost and quality may be related to each other and
are both controllable by health care providers.
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